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Monetary policy and the measurement of inflation: 
prices, wages and expectations 
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1 
Realistic measurement of inflation is of crucial importance for the conduct of monetary policy, 
which, almost universally, seeks to achieve price stability and keep inflation within 
reasonable bounds along with promoting financial stability. This is because an unrealistic 
measure of inflation to go by in monetary formulation could be unproductive or even 
counterproductive.  
The importance of having a realistic measure of inflation has acquired added significance 
and prominence in the recent period, with an increasing number of countries, especially in 
the industrialized world, adopting a monetary policy framework of “inflation targeting”, which 
involves a formal commitment to a specific rate of inflation; and in order not to put their 
credibility at risk, their monetary authorities take extra care to ensure that this specific rate is 
based on a realistic measurement of the current rate of inflation and the prospective 
economic and financial conditions that are likely to affect it in the year ahead.  
Conceptually there are several measures of inflation, each having its own merits and 
shortcomings, but the one that is most appropriate and commonly used for monitoring 
inflation is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It covers prices of those items that enter into the 
representative consumption basket of the household sector and is typically available on a 
monthly basis with short time lags. Once published, it is rarely revised. It is also widely 
known and used in revising contracts for inflation. Thus, on grounds of transparency and 
timeliness, the CPI is the preferred index for monitoring inflationary trends. 
However, to make the CPI credible, it is important that it should be computed by an 
independent national statistical agency, separate from the central bank, that should have an 
elaborate organizational set-up to collect detailed, reliable and up to date data on prices on a 
frequent basis and to undertake family budget surveys periodically to incorporate in the 
representative consumption basket the changes that take place in consumers’ needs and 
preferences over reasonable time periods. It should also make suitable adjustments in the 
CPI should there be a substantial quality change in any item that is included in the 
consumption basket. 
The staff of the statistical agency should also be competent enough to distinguish between 
“once off” or transitory factors and more permanent factors affecting inflation and remove 
volatile items to construct the “core” CPI as distinct from the “headline” (total) CPI. This is 
important because in several cases, the core index provides an appropriate measure of the 
underlying inflationary trend for the central bank to determine appropriate policy responses. 
While a realistic and credible measure of inflation plays a crucial role in the conduct of 
monetary policy, it is equally important that central banks be autonomous in formulating their 
policies without interference from other quarters. At the same time, they should have 
adequate powers and instruments at their disposal to implement their policies effectively. 
Further the financial system should be developed and well integrated so that the effects of 
monetary measures taken in one of its parts are transmitted and felt by other parts promptly.  
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In the case of oil exporting countries, there are some other special factors which profoundly 
affect the conduct of their monetary policy. Their dependence on the export of a single 
commodity, viz oil, makes the role of fiscal policy paramount and constitutes the major 
source of liquidity in these economies. Then, their non-oil production base is relatively 
limited. As a result, they depend on imports of goods and services for meeting their domestic 
requirements. This makes the domestic price situation of imported items highly reflective of 
the price trends abroad and, at the same time, disturbs their balance of payments 
equilibrium. Also, oil producing countries have generally pegged their currencies, which has 
resulted in their interest rates closely tracking the developments in international financial 
markets. This serves to relatively restrict the maneuverability in their monetary policy actions. 
In addition, their financial systems are not as developed and integrated as in advanced 
countries and so provide a less efficient transmission mechanism for monetary policy 
measures.  
Saudi Arabia’s case  
As in most countries, the primary objective of monetary policy in Saudi Arabia is to maintain 
domestic price and exchange rate stability and promote financial stability. 
For achieving the objective of domestic price stability, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA), the central bank of the country, does not follow the policy of “inflation targeting”. 
Instead, it takes measures to ensure that inflation remains within reasonable bounds and 
does not adversely affect the growth process and the welfare of the community. For this 
purpose, it constantly assesses the developing price situation and acts accordingly, taking 
other economic indicators also into account. 
The most handy and useful indicator for the price situation available to SAMA is the Cost of 
Living Index (CLI), which is prepared and published by the Central Department of Statistics 
and Information of the Ministry of Economy and Planning on a monthly basis with less than a 
month’s time lag. This index is a fairly good and reliable inflation indicator based on retail 
prices of items that enter into the consumption basket of a cross section of the population. Its 
geographical and item-wise coverage has been enlarged, its weighting system revised and 
the base year changed from time to time on the basis of periodical consumer expenditure 
surveys, the latest one having been done in 1999. The number of cities from which price data 
are collected now covers all the administrative regions of the Kingdom. The number of items 
for which prices are collected also has been considerably enlarged. The base year of the 
index, 1999, is in line with the base year used in the system of national accounts. This 
permits a meaningful comparison between the trends in the CLI and the GDP deflator. 
Moreover, the CLI has nine sub-indices for various groups of items of expenditure, which 
have proved to be analytically very useful in determining the areas experiencing inflationary 
pressures most. 
It may be mentioned that in Saudi Arabia no distinction is made between headline and core 
inflation by excluding food and energy prices from the CLI. This is because food constitutes 
the largest expenditure item in the CLI, and its exclusion would render the core CLI 
unrepresentative of the cost of living of the general public. Energy prices are not excluded as 
energy does not constitute a substantial component in consumer spending and as such it is 
less important as an inflation factor in Saudi Arabia than in non-oil economies. 
In addition to the general price index, wage trends and inflation expectations are generally 
helpful in monetary management. However, in Saudi Arabia wages are more stable due to a 
liberal labour policy, while inflation expectations have been governed by the prolonged 
stability in prices. 
The policy measures that SAMA takes to promote domestic price stability seek to ensure that 
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services in the economy. In this connection, it faces certain limitations that arise from the 
structural makeup of the Saudi economy. 
Saudi Arabia, being an oil based economy, has two distinct features that profoundly affect 
the conduct of monetary policy. First, the oil income accruing to the government makes fiscal 
operations the major source of domestic liquidity. This is indicated by the fact that the net 
domestic expenditure of the government accounted for as much as 77% of the total domestic 
liquidity (gross) generated during 2003–07 (Table 2). Secondly, the non-oil production base 
of the country is relatively limited, necessitating a large import of goods and services. This 
results in a substantial private sector balance of payments deficit through which the bulk of 
the gross liquidity generated in the economy leaves the country (73% in 2003–07). These 
two influences on domestic liquidity are quite powerful but are not directly amenable to 
SAMA’s control. The factor affecting domestic liquidity that lends itself to SAMA’s control is 
bank credit to the private sector, but because of the relatively limited size of the private 
sector, its influence on domestic liquidity is much smaller than that of government domestic 
expenditure and the private sector’s deficit in its external transactions. Additionally, with the 
current expansion of both money and capital markets, the efficacy of monetary policy in 
Saudi Arabia is being strengthened.  
In spite of the above limitations, SAMA has succeeded in achieving its monetary policy 
objectives by conducting its policies in coordination with the fiscal and trade and payments 
policies of the government. By reinforcing each other, these policies have proved quite 
effective in achieving monetary and financial stability in both the domestic and external 
spheres. This is demonstrated by the remarkable stability in the domestic price level and the 
exchange rate of the Saudi riyal at the same time over a long period. 
For about the quarter century up to 2005, inflation in Saudi Arabia, as measured by the CLI, 
remained on average well below 1 percent per annum. It is only since 2006 that inflation has 
been on the rise in the country. It may be mentioned in this connection that, since 2002, the 
increase in government spending has led to intensification in economic activity, especially in 
the private sector, and the economy has started to get close to its capacity. The increase in 
government spending has also caused accelerated growth in the money supply, which 
averaged 13% per annum during 2002–05 and spurted to over 19% in 2006 and 2007. 
These developments indicate that it is the substantial rise in government expenditure based 
on increased income accruing from oil exports, rather than any monetary policy impulse, that 
has contributed to the recent emergence of inflationary pressures in the country. The sharp 
increase in international food prices and an inordinately large pickup in domestic rents, two 
items that together carry a substantial weight (44%) in the household’s expenditure budget, 
have also been important contributory factors.  
The inflation rate picked up to 2.2% in 2006 and to 4.1% in 2007. It rose further in 2008 to 
reach the highest level in 30 years, at 11.2% (year over year) in the month of July. 
The upsurge in inflation prompted responses from both the government and SAMA. To 
provide relief to the people, the government has granted a subsidy on basic food stuffs, 
reduced import tariffs and service charges, provided an inflation allowance for three years 
and raised social insurance benefits. Also, mortgage and other relevant laws are in the 
process of being approved, and the Public Authority for Housing has been established. 
SAMA, for its part, increased the reserve requirement for banks against their demand 
deposits from 7% to 9% in November 2007, to 10% in January 2008, to 12% in April 2008 
and to 13% in May 2008. It also raised the reserve requirement for time and savings deposits 
from 2% to 4% in May 2008. SAMA also took prudential measures to restrain the growth in 
consumer credits. Moreover, it kept the benchmark repo rate unchanged at 5.5% from 
February 2007 until 11 October 2008 to signify its anti-inflationary resolve.  
These monetary measures by SAMA proved quite effective in restraining credit extension by 
banks. Meanwhile, rent and food prices also steadied. In consequence, the inflation rate 
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September. In view of these developments and to ensure that economic activity does not 
suffer due to tight credit conditions, especially in the context of bearish influences of the 
prevailing global financial crisis, SAMA relaxed its policies by bringing down the reserve 
requirement for banks on their current account deposits from 13% to 10% on 12 October 
2008, and further to 7% on 23 November. It also reduced the repo rate from 5.5% to 5.0% on 
12 October, to 4% on 30 October and to 3% with effect from 22 November 2008. These 
measures are expected to boost the liquidity position of banks which would enable them to 
expand credit and thereby provide the much needed stimulus to domestic demand for 
sustaining economic activity, especially in the context of the prevalent worldwide 
recessionary trends. 
It can thus be seen that SAMA has used its policy instruments flexibly to suit the changing 
circumstances, with its policy stance always remaining geared to promoting and achieving 
the objectives of domestic price and financial stability and the exchange rate stability of the 
Saudi riyal.  
The exchange rate of the Saudi riyal (SAR) has been maintained at SAR 3.75 per US dollar 
since 1986. It may be mentioned here that the Saudi riyal has been formally pegged to the 
US dollar since the beginning of 2003 at SAR 3.75 per dollar. Prior to that it was pegged to 
the SDR, but since 1981, when the margins of 7.25% around SDR/SAR parity were 
suspended, a de facto link was maintained with the US dollar, which is the intervention 
currency. Since mid-1986, the link has been maintained at SAR 3.75 per U.S. dollar, on a de 
facto basis up to the end of 2002 and formally since then.  
The exchange rate of the Saudi riyal vis-à-vis other international currencies have also 
remained within tolerable limits. SAMA keeps a careful watch on the Saudi riyal market to 
ensure its smooth functioning and takes corrective measures should there be any disruptive 
activities. Only on a few occasions, some pressures on the Saudi riyal’s exchange rate have 
developed, but these have been promptly relieved by SAMA’s intervention in the market. 
The moral that emerges from the above episode of SAMA’s monetary management is that in 
an oil-based economy, there is a greater need for a coordinated approach between 
monetary, fiscal and other economic policies than in other economies. BIS Papers No 49  329
 
 
Table 1 – Saudi Arabia: Cost of Living Index  
(1999 = 100) 
 
Year  General index  % change  
2001 97.8  -1.1 
2002 98.0 +0.2 
2003 98.6 +0.6 
2004 98.9 +0.3 
2005 99.6 +0.7 
2006 101.8 +2.2 






                +11.2 (yoy) 
August  117.9                  +10.9 (yoy) 
September  118.3                  +10.4 (yoy) 
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% share in gross 
generation of 
domestic liquidity
Government net domestic 
expenditure  1,154.7 77.3 
Change in bank credit to the 
private sector  397.6 26.6 
Miscellaneous factors  -58.2  -3.9 
Gross generation of 
domestic liquidity  1,494.1 100.0 
Leakage through private 
sector bop deficit  -1,090.6 -73.0 
Net generation of domestic 
liquidity  403.5  
 
Table 3 – Saudi Arabia: Changes in Non-oil GDP,  
Domestic Liquidity and Cost of Living Index 
(In percent)  
 
Period 





Cost of living 
index 
1981-1990 
Average  1.8 7.4 -0.2 
1991-1995  2.1 5.2 2.1 
1996-2000 3.7  5.7  -0.4 
2001-2005  4.1 11.7 0.1 
2006 5.1 19.3 2.2 








          20.8 (yoy) 
          21.8 (yoy) 
          19.4 (yoy) 
 
          11.2 (yoy) 
          10.9 (yoy) 
          10.4 (yoy) 
 
 